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Since the Treaty of Westphalia, sovereignty has been backed by the norm of nonintervention.  
By contrast, the responsibility to protect (R2P) strikes a balance between unauthorised 
unilateral interventions and institutionalised indifference.  With a rapidly deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in Libya in early 2011, the United Nations (UN) authorised the use of 
force to protect an imminent slaughter of civilians but prohibited taking sides in the internal civil 
war, intervening with ground troops, or effecting forcible regime change.  The record of NATO 
actions in Libya marks a triumph for R2P but also raises questions about how to prevent the 
abuse of UN authority to use international force for purposes beyond human protection. 
Military action by international forces in Libya in 2011 marks the first instance 
of the implementation of the sharp edge of the new norm of the responsibility 
to protect (R2P).  It was a successful example, if also a controversial one.  
Until the twentieth century, state sovereignty included the right to go to war 
and an unchallengeable monopoly on the lawful use of force domestically.  
Gradually by the time of the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and 
more rapidly thereafter, the right to use force internationally was restricted to 
self-defence against armed attack or under UN authorisation.  Historically, 
the norm of nonintervention notwithstanding, individual states had also 
intervened inside sovereign jurisdictions to stop the slaughter of kith and kin 
or co-religionists.1  Under the impact of the Holocaust and starting with the 
Genocide Convention in 1948, the international community asserted the 
collective right to stop states killing large numbers of civilians inside their 
borders. 
Even so, for 350 years—from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 until 1998—
sovereignty functioned as institutionalised indifference.  International 
interventions in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 broke that mould and were 
the backdrop to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s search for a new norm.  
His genius lay in channelling historic ideational transformations into new 
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institutional linkages.  Instead of collective gnashing and wailing during 
atrocities followed by a traumatic repeat afterwards, yet again, of promises of 
‘Never Again’, he pushed for a new doctrine to take timely and effective 
action.  With Canada’s help, an international commission formulated the 
innovative principle of the responsibility to protect.2 
The UN was neither designed nor expected to be a pacifist organisation.  On 
the contrary, its origins lie in the anti-Nazi wartime military alliance among 
Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.  Its primary purpose is the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  The chief responsibility for 
doing this is vested in the all-powerful UN Security Council as the world’s 
sole and duly sworn in sheriff for enforcing international law and order. 
The system of collective security against interstate aggression never 
materialised.  In the decades after World War II the nature of armed conflict 
was transformed.3  Interstate warfare between uniformed armies gave way 
to irregular conflict between rival armed groups.  The nature of the state too 
changed from its idealised European version.  Many communist and some 
newly-decolonised countries were internal security states whose regimes 
ruled through terror.  Increasingly, the principal victims of both types of 
violence were civilians.  Advances in telecommunications brought the full 
horror of their plight into the world’s living rooms.  R2P spoke eloquently to 
the need to change the UN’s normative framework in line with the changed 
reality of threats and victims.4 
In the meantime, the goals of promoting human rights and democratic 
governance, protecting civilian victims of humanitarian atrocities and 
punishing governmental perpetrators of mass crimes became more 
important.  Our understanding and appreciation of human rights and 
commitment to their promotion and protection have deepened and 
broadened.5  The chief impulse to human rights is the recognition that every 
human being is deserving of equal moral consideration.  It is an acceptance 
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of a duty of care by those living in safety towards those trapped in zones of 
danger.  The UN’s normative mandates on security, development and 
human rights alike embody this powerful intuition.6 
Failure to act in the 1994 Rwanda genocide7 and non-UN-authorised 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 set off angry and deeply divisive 
recriminations around the world for acts of omission and commission.8  In 
the wake of that controversy, the 2001 report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued that the 
essential nature of sovereignty had changed from state privileges and 
immunities to the responsibility to protect people from atrocity crimes.  
Where the state defaulted on its solemn responsibility owing to lack of will or 
capacity, or because it was itself complicit in the commission of the 
atrocities, the responsibility to protect tripped upwards to the international 
community acting through the authenticated structures and procedures of 
the UN. 
The importance of sovereignty as the key organising principle of the modern 
world order needed and received a strong affirmation in the ICISS report.  
The Commission took pains to emphasise that a cohesive and peaceful 
international system is more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of 
effective and legitimate states than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, 
fragmenting or generally chaotic states.9 
Reconceptualising sovereignty as responsibility10 was not a radical departure 
from established precept and practice.  Nowhere is the authority of the state 
absolute.  Internally, it is constrained and regulated by constitutional power-
sharing arrangements and shared between different levels of government: 
local, provincial and national.  It is also distributed among different sectors of 
public authorities at any one given level, such as the legislature, executive, 
judiciary and bureaucracy.  Internationally, too, in human rights covenants, 
UN practice and state practice itself, sovereignty is understood as embracing 
responsibility.  The UN Charter is itself an example of an international 
obligation voluntarily accepted by member states. 
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There is no transfer or dilution of the status of state sovereignty.  But there is 
a necessary change in the exercise of sovereignty: from sovereignty as 
control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external 
duties.  Anne Orford argues that contrary to claims that the requirement is to 
put the R2P principle into practice, ICISS in fact put evolving practice of 
contingent and softening sovereignty, and of increasing international 
intrusions, into a new concept: the justificatory principle followed practice, 
words followed deeds.  R2P is an attempt to integrate existing and evolving 
but dispersed practices of protection into a conceptually coherent account of 
international authority.11 
The unanimous endorsement of R2P by the largest ever collection of world 
leaders at the UN summit in 2005 was historic, for it spoke to the 
fundamental purposes of the UN and responded to a critical challenge of the 
21st century.  Some 150 world leaders tightened the application of R2P to 
four atrocity crimes: war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity.  They affirmed that states have the primary responsibility 
to protect all people within their territorial jurisdiction but that if they 
manifestly failed to do so, owing to incapacity, unwillingness or complicity in 
the crimes, then the international community, acting through the UN Security 
Council, would take timely and decisive action to implement the international 
responsibility to protect.12  Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon then refined the 
principle further in the language of three pillars: Pillar One as the state’s own 
responsibility; Pillar Two as international assistance to strengthen state 
capacity to implement R2P obligations; and Pillar Three as coercive 
international action, including measures not involving the use of force under 
Article 41 of the United Nations Charter (for example economic sanctions, 
arms embargoes, and asset freezes) and, ultimately, military force under 
Article 42.13 
R2P captures and channels the convergence of some significant trends in 
world affairs.  Its preventive and rebuilding pillars involve strengthening a 
state’s capacity to handle its own law and order problems.  But its hard edge 
requires the international community, acting through the UN, to take up the 
slack when any state defaults on its sovereign responsibility to protect all 
people inside its borders. 
By its very nature, including unpredictability, unintended consequences and 
the risk to innocent civilians caught in the crossfire, warfare is inherently 
brutal: there is nothing humanitarian about the means.  Still, the fact is that 
our ability and tools to act beyond our borders have increased tremendously.  
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This greatly increases demands and expectations ‘to do something’ and the 
fundamental question cannot be avoided: under what circumstances is the 
use of force necessary, justified and required to provide effective 
international humanitarian protection to at-risk populations without the 
consent of their own government? Absent R2P, the intervention is more 
likely to be ad hoc, unilateral, self-interested and deeply divisive.  With the 
R2P norm and guiding principles agreed to in advance, military action is 
more likely to be rules-based, multilateral, disinterested and consensual. 
Not a Western Implant 
The R2P debate is emphatically not a West versus The Rest narrative.  
Instead the theory and practice of state sovereignty is itself decidedly 
European.  Developing countries, not Western ones, are the likely targets of 
international military interventions.  If their people are the principal 
beneficiaries and their states the main victims when R2P is put into practice, 
their scholars, think tank analysts, public intellectuals and journalists should 
be the lead debaters.  Asia has its own rich traditions that vest sovereigns 
with responsibility for the lives and welfare of subjects while circumscribing 
the exercise of power with the majesty of law that stands above the agents 
of the state.  In India Ashoka, the great Mauryan emperor (269–232 BC), 
inscribed the following message on a rock edict: “this is my rule: government 
by the law, administration according to the law, gratification of my subjects 
under the law, and protection through the law”.14 
The debate is also wrongly framed on substance.  In the real world, we know 
that there will be more atrocities, victims and perpetrators—and therefore 
more interventions.  They were common before R2P; they are not 
guaranteed with R2P.  The real choice is not if interventions will take place, 
but when, why, how, by whom and under whose authority.  Unilateral and ad 
hoc interventions will sow and nourish the seeds of international discord.  
Multilateral and rules-based interventions will speak powerfully to the world’s 
determination never again to return to institutionalised indifference to mass 
atrocities. 
R2P attempts to strike a balance between unilateral interference and 
institutionalised indifference.  It will help the world to be better prepared—
normatively, organisationally and operationally—to meet the recurrent 
challenge of external military intervention wherever and whenever it arises 
again, as assuredly it will.  To interveners, R2P offers the prospect of 
international legitimacy, reduced compliance and transaction costs and more 
effective results.  To potential targets of intervention, R2P offers the 
reassurance of a rules-based system.  Absent an agreed new set of rules, 
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there will be nothing to stop the powerful from intervening ‘anywhere and 
everywhere’.  
Gaddafi in the Crosshairs of a Changing Normative Order 
R2P is narrow—it applies only to the four crimes of ethnic cleansing, 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  But it is deep: there are 
no limits to what can be done in responding to these atrocity crimes.  In a 
matching symmetry, support for R2P has been broad but shallow.15  Libya in 
2011 provided an opportunity to convert the noble sentiments and solemn 
promise of R2P into meaningful action whose import will resonate long and 
far.  In poignant testament to its tragic origins and normative power, R2P 
was the discourse of choice in debating how best to respond to the crisis. 
R2P is not solely about military intervention.  The world’s comfort level is 
greater with action under Pillars One (building state capacity) and Two 
(international assistance to build state capacity) than Pillar Three (coercive 
international action with the final option being military intervention to protect 
at-risk populations from atrocity crimes).  But, to be meaningful, the R2P 
spectrum of action must include military force as the option of last resort. 
Three sets of issues were involved in framing the most appropriate and 
effective response to the Libyan crisis: military capacity, legal authority, and 
political legitimacy.  Analysts were divided on the scale, complexity and 
feasibility of a no-fly zone.  Only the West has the requisite assets and 
operational capability for military action in the Libyan theatre.  But NATO 
would have been ill-advised to take any military action on its own authority.  
Political commentators warned of mission creep.  But that would arise only if 
ownership of the uprising was appropriated from the Libyans.  No one asked 
for foreign boots on the ground.  UN legal authorisation could be restricted to 
four military tasks: surveillance and monitoring, humanitarian assistance, 
enforcement of the arms embargo, and enforcement of a no-fly zone. 
The UN Security Council, Human Rights Council and Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon called on Libya to respect its R2P, human rights and international 
humanitarian law obligations.16  When their appeals were ignored, on 26 
February, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence in Libya, 
which “may amount to crimes against humanity”; imposed sanctions; 
affirmed Libya’s R2P obligations; and referred Gaddafi to the International 
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Criminal Court (Resolution 1970).17  On 4 March, both the Global Centre and 
International Coalition for R2P published an open letter to the Security 
Council pointing out that Resolution 1970 had failed to halt attacks taking 
place at the moment and calling for additional protective measures.18 
Although Britain and France took the lead in trying to mobilise diplomatic 
support for some military action to help the Libyan rebels, the critical turning 
point was US backing.  The key decision was made by President Barack 
Obama at a meeting with top officials on 15 March.  R2P gave him the 
necessary intellectual and normative tool to act.  He decided to side with pro-
interventionist advisers in favour of a definition of the Libyan crisis that was 
closer to his instincts and consistent with the narrative that won him the 
White House.19  The game-changer was the juxtaposition of R2P as a 
powerful new galvanising norm; the defection of Libyan diplomats who joined 
the chorus of calls from the rebels for immediate action to protect civilians; 
and Arab, French and British participation that provided political cover and 
international legitimacy.  In Iraq in 2003, Washington was the ardent suitor 
for military intervention.  In Libya in 2011, Washington was the reluctant 
follower. 
Adopted on 17 March by a 10-0-5 (China, Russia, Brazil, Germany, India) 
vote, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorised the use of “all 
necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas”: the 
first UN-sanctioned combat operations since the 1991 Gulf War.20  In the 
Balkans, it took NATO almost the full decade to intervene with air power in 
Kosovo in 1999.  In Libya, it took just one month to mobilise a broad 
coalition, secure a UN mandate to protect civilians, establish and enforce no-
fly and no-drive zones, stop Gaddafi’s advancing army and prevent a 
massacre of the innocents in Benghazi. 
Carefully crafted both to authorise and delimit the scope of intervention, 
Resolution 1973 specified the purpose of military action as humanitarian 
protection and limited the means to that goal.  At a time when the recapture 
of Benghazi by Gaddafi loyalists seemed imminent, Resolution 1973 
authorised military action to prevent such civilian slaughter but not intervene 
in the civil war (any state has the right to use force to suppress armed 
uprisings), nor effect regime change.  Occupying or dismembering Libya was 
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prohibited.  Gaddafi was not to be directly targeted.  To the extent that he 
was so targeted, NATO exceeded UN authority in breach of the Charter law. 
Obama’s insistence that the United States would not be deploying ground 
troops aligned military means to the limited ambitions and objectives: 
humanitarian protection, not regime change.21  In contrast to the Bush 
doctrine, under Obama the United States will act in concert with others, not 
alone; coax, persuade and heed, not impose its will; and set clear limits on 
goals and means.  This did not please some shadow warriors.  Referring to 
the role of Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice, and Samantha Power in the decision 
to join the intervention against the inclinations of Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates, National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon and Chief of 
Counterterrorism John Brennan, Jacob Heibrunn derided Obama for 
effectively having been henpecked into interventionism by “these Valkyries 
of foreign affairs”.22  Not to be outdone on misogyny, Mark Krikorian 
commented caustically that “our commander-in-chief is an effete vacillator 
who is pushed around by his female subordinates”.23 
Norm Consolidation or Abuse 
As the collection of articles in this special issue makes clear, there is a close 
normative and operational link between R2P and the protection of civilians 
(PoC).  The jury is still out on whether international military action in Libya 
and Côte d’Ivoire will promote consolidation or softening of the twin norms.  
There were inconsistencies in the muted response to protests and uprisings 
in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia where vital Western geopolitical and oil 
interests are directly engaged, and with the lack of equally forceful military 
action in Syria and Yemen.  Western failures to defend the dignity and rights 
of Palestinians under Israeli occupation have been especially damaging to 
their claims to promote human rights and oppose humanitarian atrocities 
universally instead of selectively. 
Despite the doubts, the alternative of standing idly on the sidelines yet again 
would have added to the shamefully long list of rejecting the collective 
responsibility to protect.  Gaddafi would have prevailed and we have no 
reason to doubt his threat to embark on a methodical killing spree of rebel 
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leaders, cities and regions alley by alley, house by house, room by room.  
Had the world shirked its responsibility, Libya could have been the graveyard 
of the new R2P norm and the UN might as well have sounded the last post 
for it. 
Libya marks the first time the Security Council has authorised an 
international R2P operation.  Côte d’Ivoire is the first time it has authorised 
the use of military force by outside powers solely for PoC.  Between them, 
Resolutions 1973 and 1975 show that including R2P language in the 
preamble might provide the normative justification for PoC demands in the 
operational paragraphs of the UN mandates. 
Many PoC champions fear the more overtly politicised agenda of R2P.  This 
ignores the reality of how they come together when atrocity crimes are being 
committed.  PoC advocates are nervous about being cross-contaminated by 
R2P because they tend to focus on the soft side of the subject, such as 
programs to train peacekeepers, rather than the sharp end of robust military 
action.  In justifying the authorisation of all necessary measures by the UN 
peace operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Security Council Resolution 1975 
reaffirmed “the primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians” and, 
in the same sentence, reiterated that “parties to armed conflict bear the 
primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of 
civilians”.24 
Seamus Milne, convinced that the Arab revolution had been hijacked by the 
imperialist West in Libya, argued that “If stopping the killing had been the 
real aim, Nato states would have backed a ceasefire and a negotiated 
settlement, rather than repeatedly vetoing both”.25  Terry Macalister, the 
Guardian’s energy editor, believes that “The Libyan conflict has been a war 
about oil if not ‘for’ oil”.  The British and French governments have worked 
“hand in glove” with the big energy companies in the war to rid Libya of 
Gaddafi and secure access to future energy supplies, he argues.  He asks 
whether their cooperation is “a potent symbol that western politics and oil are 
so closely intermeshed that the agendas of both are indistinguishable”?26 
In his speech to the General Assembly, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh made a thinly-veiled attack on the expansive interpretation by NATO 
of Resolution 1973: “Actions taken under the authority of the United Nations 
must respect the unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of 
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individual states”.27  Russia and China led the chorus of dismay at the UN 
appearing to take sides in the internal conflicts in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire.28  
They may be less willing in future to permit sweeping endorsements for 
tough action, either by a coalition (Libya) or by UN peacekeepers (Côte 
d’Ivoire). 
Value-free pragmatism is no more an answer to the challenge of reconciling 
realism and idealism than opportunistic humanitarianism.  Brazil, China, 
Germany, India, and Russia joined the African Union (AU) in positioning 
themselves on the wrong side of the war—as witnessed in the triumphal visit 
of British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy to Libya in September—and on the wrong side of history insofar as 
the emerging normative architecture is concerned.  The AU moved to 
recognise the rebel Transitional National Council on 20 September, only 
after they had captured Tripoli.  Among others, one risk for the AU is that the 
new regime will highlight its Arab over its African heritage and identity.29  The 
reason this matters is that, following the Libya precedent, regional 
organisations may well acquire a critical ‘gatekeeping role’ in the global 
authorisation of R2P-type operations.30  As long as the rising new powers 
remain more concerned with consolidating their national power aspirations 
than developing the norms and institutions of global governance,31 they will 
remain incomplete powers, limited by their own narrow ambitions, with their 
material grasp being longer than their normative reach. 
The Libyan people’s euphoria and NATO’s relief over the successful military 
campaign is likely to temper criticisms of the manner in which NATO rode 
roughshod over UN authorisation to protect civilians.  For NATO had indeed 
intervened on behalf of one side in a civil war and pursued regime change.  
That said, we should not retreat into naivety on what may be required in 
particular circumstances.  Already in 2003, replying to criticisms of the ICISS 
report by Adam Roberts, I had noted that “the primary motivation behind 
intervention—the cause rather than the necessary condition—must not be 
defeating an enemy state”.  But “If defeat of a non-compliant state or regime 
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is the only way to achieve the human protection goals, then so be it”.32  In 
Libya, the West’s strategic interests coincided with UN values.  This does not 
mean that the latter was subordinated to the former.  It does mean, as with 
Australia vis-à-vis East Timor in 1999, that there was a better prospect of 
sustained NATO engagement than if Western interests were not affected. 
Paris, London and Washington—and Ban—did not waver in their resolve, 
despite critics from the left pushing for diplomacy, not war and critics from 
the right calling for boots on the ground.  The protracted wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan notwithstanding, too many expected or demanded instant 
military gratification.  In fact six months to overthrow an entrenched and 
determined dictator is not excessively long.  Moreover, it is also true that had 
all the restrictions of Resolution 1973 been scrupulously observed, the war 
would have been more protracted and messier, and coalition unity of 
purpose and action would have been even more strained. 
The outcome is a triumph first and foremost for the citizen soldiers who 
refused to let fear of Gaddafi’s thugs determine their destiny any longer.  It is 
triumph secondly for R2P.  It is possible for the international community, 
working through the authenticated, UN-centred structures and procedures of 
organised multilateralism, to deploy international force to neutralise the 
military might of a thug and intervene between him and his victims with 
reduced civilian casualties and little risk of military casualties.  NATO military 
muscle deployed on behalf of UN political will help to level the killing field 
between citizens and a tyrant. 
But the ruins of Libya’s political infrastructure and parlous state of its coffers 
mean that the third component in the ICISS formulation R2P—the 
international responsibility to rebuild and reconstruct33—will also be called 
on.  This will require the international community to stay engaged with state 
building in Libya for some time.  Fortunately, Libya’s physical infrastructure 
remains mainly intact as there was no Iraq-style shock-and-awe bombing 
campaign.  The willingness, nature and duration of outside help will also help 
to shape the judgment of history on whether Western motivations were 
primarily self-interested geopolitical and commercial, or the disinterested 
desire to protect civilians from a murderous rampage.  As with the war itself, 
however, the lead role will have to be assumed by Libyans themselves, while 
the international community can assist without assuming ownership of the 
process or responsibility for the outcome. 
The price of that in turn may require the international community to accept 
and live with the political choices made by the Libyans.  The Transitional 
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National Council’s immediate priorities are to establish security, law and 
order; prevent lootings and reprisals and avoid attacks on black Africans by 
lighter-skinned Arabs as the new normal; defeat remaining pockets of 
resistance by Gaddafi loyalists and prevent them from turning into a 
protracted low-level insurgency, and establish control over the whole 
country; restore infrastructure and public services; and ameliorate the 
humanitarian situation.  National reconciliation based on the politics of 
concessions, compromises and power-sharing accommodation, 
reconstruction and continuing regional and international support will be the 
next order of business after immediate humanitarian needs have been met. 
Conclusion 
In both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, regimes that had lost all domestic and 
international legitimacy declared war on their own people.  In both, global 
political responses were shaped by universal values as well as strategic 
interests, so that UN member states moved closer to mirroring traditional UN 
policy and perspectives.  Because the UN is taking the lead in redefining 
sovereignty by aligning state prerogatives with the will and consent of the 
people, the ruling class of any country must now fear the risk and threat of 
international economic, criminal justice and military action if they violate 
global standards of conduct and cross UN red lines of behaviour.34 
The two operations in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire therefore mark a pivotal 
rebalancing of interests and values.  In the old world order, international 
politics, like all politics, was a struggle for power.35  The new international 
politics will be about the struggle for the ascendancy of competing normative 
architectures based on a combination of power, understood as the 
disciplined application of force, and values and ideas. 
At the time of writing, the rebels had captured Tripoli but not Gaddafi.  Hard 
questions, unasked so as not to complicate the push for victory, will now 
come to the fore.  Who are the rebels? What do they stand for? For whom 
do they speak? How much popular support do they command? Albeit 
qualified and incomplete, therefore, Libya nevertheless does mark an 
important milestone on the journey to tame atrocities on their own people by 
tyrants. 
In the words of former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN was 
“not created in order to bring us to heaven, but to save us from hell”.36 
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Failures in Africa and the Balkans in the 1990s reflected structural, political 
and operational deficiencies that accounted for the UN’s inability to save 
people from a life of hell on earth.  R2P responds to the idealised UN as the 
symbol of an imagined and constructed community of strangers: We are our 
brothers’ and sisters’ keepers. 
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